Living Systems in Jainism: A Scientific Study: 10.03 ►The Pramana Type of Knowledge and its Essential Nature

Published: 25.06.2018

Pramana is a valid organ of knowledge:

  1. That cognition, through which determination of itself and others is made
  2. That cognition, through which right determination of the object is made
  3. A limb of logic (naya); that valid cognition, which is without doubt and contradiction.

Naya is not the only form of knowledge. "Knowledge is accomplished," says Umasvati, "by means of pramanas and nayas." Generally, we come across two types of knowledge. First, there is a type that follows the fragmentary process of comprehension and touches only a slice of reality. The other type of knowledge aims at giving a comprehensive view of the real. The pramana and naya types of knowledge are distinguished by their total and partial approaches to the real. Devanandi says: "A pramana takes the whole of a real as its subject-matter." Vimaladasa also mentions: "A total comprehension of reality is the knowledge of the pramana type." This may appear to lead to the impossibility of the pramana type of knowledge. Our experience testifies to the fact that we are never able to comprehend the totality of reality. Samantabhadra, therefore, has well said: "The knowledge of reality which enlightens the whole of it simultaneously is the pramana." Thus perfect knowledge or the kevalajnana alone can be designated as the pramana type of knowledge; in the lower stages of existence, a pramana cannot be experienced. In Jain works, along with kevalajnana, sensuous knowledge, scriptural knowledge, clairvoyance, and mind reading have also been enumerated as yielding the pramana type of knowledge, though they never apprehend reality as a whole. The totality common to all of the aforesaid types of knowledge must not be taken to mean the all-inclusive totality of reality, whose comprehension is held to be possible only in the perfect stage. All of the pramana types of knowledge except perfect knowledgecomprehend reality only partially, and the total comprehension of reality does not form the criterion for the pramana type of knowledge. Hence, in the pramana type of knowledge the presumed totality is not vitiated by the fact that it does not comprehend reality as a whole. This also leads to the conclusion that pramana knowledge is possible in spite of the fragmentation it may involve.

Similar meaning is given to the term sakaladesa, which is taken to be the differentia of the pramana knowledge. Pramana knowledge must not presuppose a totality in the sense of all-inclusiveness, as the term sakaladesa may suggest, but it must be the totality of a system. When we aim at the isolation of one or more aspects from a system (presented as an object) we get naya knowledge; when such isolation is not desired, we get pramana knowledge. Kevalajnana comprehends the entire system of the universe; the lower and smaller systems are comprehended by other pramanas. The totality of a system should not be taken to mean the aggregate of its constituents: an aggregate of partial comprehensions also cannot yield a pramana. Rajamalla opposes the view that a pramana is an aggregate of the nayas. "A pramana has a different taste (essence) from the aggregate of nayas." "Negation is preceded by affirmation and affirmation by negation. The knowledge which comprehends the union of the two is the pramana." Joachim also maintains a similar view. He observes: "To treat science as a sum, aggregate, collection of class of single truths, each of which is what it is in its singleness and remains unchanged in the collection is utterly inadequate as a theory of knowledge." A pramana may include the nayas but is not identified with them; it always transcends the aggregate of the nayas. The totality of the nayas gains in essence that which is lost when a partial analysis of a pramana is affected. This special essence is suggested by assigning a different taste (rasa) to the pramana. In these bits of sensuous knowledge, the entity presented to the senses is comprehended as a whole and without isolation, so this type of knowledge is classed with the pramanas.

Pramana is mainly of two types:

1. Direct Perception or Perceptual Cognition (Pratyaksa). This is of two types:

(a) Sensual perception. Perception made through the senses, directly or through instruments

(b) Non-sensual perception. This is of three sub-types:

i.  Perception through clairvoyance

ii. Perception through mind reading

iii. Direct perception by soul or perception of Omniscient

2. Indirect Perception. This is of three types:

(a) Inductive reasoning or Logic or Inference (Anumaana). The existence or absence of a thing is decided on the basis of the existence or absence of another thing, i.e. causality. Many scientific observations, which are the effects of a phenomenon, fall in this category.

(b) Analogy or Comparison (Upamana)

(c) Scriptures, written records of the teachings of the Omniscient (Agama)

Sources
Title: Living System in Jainism: A Scientific Study
Author: Prof. Narayan Lal Kachhara
Edition: 2018
Publisher: Kundakunda Jñānapīṭha, Indore, India
Share this page on:
Page glossary
Some texts contain  footnotes  and  glossary  entries. To distinguish between them, the links have different colors.
  1. Agama
  2. Clairvoyance
  3. Mind Reading
  4. Naya
  5. Nayas
  6. Omniscient
  7. Pramana
  8. Rasa
  9. Science
  10. Soul
Page statistics
This page has been viewed 365 times.
© 1997-2024 HereNow4U, Version 4.56
Home
About
Contact us
Disclaimer
Social Networking

HN4U Deutsche Version
Today's Counter: