Jai Jinendra.
I deeply appreciate the willingness of Dr. Kachhara to engage these issues and I am delighted that he acknowledges that strict vegetarianism (veganism) is required by Jaina doctrine under most circumstances.
I do, however, disagree with his view that domestication is justifiable. He appears to make three arguments.
First, he argues that domestication occurred as a matter of historical necessity. That may or may not be true as an empirical matter. I have serious doubts about this historical claim but let us assume for present purposes that the claim is true. The necessity of a practice does not mean that the practice is morally justifiable. There are those who argue--with considerable justification--that humankind would not have been able to develop and progress without human slavery. That may be true but it would still not make the institution of slavery morally justifiable.
Moreover, continuing to cause or to facilitate the production of domesticated nonhumans is no longer necessary. Therefore, continuing the institution can only be justified by an appeal to tradition. But if Jainism teaches us anything, it is that we must critically analyze issues and not merely rely on tradition to decide fundamental matters of morality. We must ask whether, irrespective of what was or was not the case in the past, we can continue to justify domestication. As Jains, we cannot rest on an appeal to tradition.
Second, Dr. Kachhara argues that domestication does not inherently involve Himsa and that any Himsa is contingent on modern practice and is not a necessary feature of domestication. I respectfully disagree in that domestication necessarily involves our imposing significant genetic and behavioral changes on animals.
Moreover, domestication, however it is practiced and whether it occurs in an industrial context or the small family farm in India, involves humans owning five-sensed organisms. Domesticated nonhumans are necessarily someone's property. Domestication requires that we control the lives of multiple-sensed beings. This implicates an important issue involving the intersection of Ahimsa and Aparigraha.
Third, Dr. Kachhara suggests that my position about domestication requires that we turn away from our responsibility to protect domesticated animals.
This is not the case. I have tried to be very clear that I believe that we have a moral obligation to care for the domesticated nonhumans we presently have. But I believe that our fidelity to Ahimsa requires that we stop bringing (directly or indirectly) any more domesticated nonhumans into existence.
My partner and I live with four rescued dogs. We have had as many as seven dogs at one time--all rescues. We regard these animals as refugees. We love them and treat them as members of our family. But if there were only two dogs left on the planet and it were up to us as to whether these dogs reproduced so that humans could continue to have pets, the answer would be a very clear "no."
As a final observation, Dr. Kachhara appears to promote the notion that it is acceptable for humans to use nonhumans as long as we treat them "humanely." Even if we could reduce to a significant degree the Himsa involved in the production of dairy products and wool--and as a matter of practical economics I do not believe that this is possible--it would still leave the question of whether our use of animals--however "humane," can be justified morally. It is, of course, better to beat the slaves one time a week rather than ten times. But that does not address the issue whether slavery, as an institution, can be justified however well we treat the slaves.
I do not intend to offend anyone by these comments. If anyone is nonetheless offended, Micchami Dukkadam.
Gary L. Francione
Professor, Rutgers University
New Jersey, U.S.A.