Dr. Bachh Raj Dugar
Nalin K.Shastree
The Polish Movement
The Gdansk Shipyard Strike (1980) that won Poles the right to have free trade unions, launched the Solidarity movement and catapulted Lech Walesa, a shipyard electrician, on a path of leadership that eventually gave him a Nobel Peace Prize in 1983 and led to the fall of communism in Poland and the election of Walesa to the presidency of the country.
The Soviet forces that liberated Poland from the Nazis at the end of World War II had installed a client communist regime, under which workers could not organize or represent themselves before the state-owned enterprises that employed them. By the 1970s frustration with 30 years of one-party rule began to surface, as workers all over Poland twice protested price increases. The regime responded with only temporary concessions that were quickly followed by renewed repressions.
By the late 1970s the Polish economy was on the brink of collapse. Prime Minister Edward Gierek eased certain constraints and opened a dialogue with the Catholic Church. A visit by Pope John Paul II in 1979 - highlighted by an outdoor mass for three million people - drew Poles together on a scale far larger than anything workers and dissidents had dreamed of. In July 1980, when the government more than doubles meat prices, a series of nationwide strikes ensued. While many strikers were bought off with higher wages, striking employees at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk remained adamant in their demands. The regime threatened to smother the strike by sealing off Gdansk. Shipyard workers came out across the city, and sympathetic students and professionals slipped through roadblocks, by way of bringing news of the strike to other regions. Vesting ultimate authority in the Gdansk-based Inter-factory Strike Committee (MKS), the workers elected Lech Walesa, a shipyard electrician, as its head. By late August the MKS represented 400,000 workers. Bulwarked by a wave of support from foreign trade unions and intensified media coverage, the MKS soon presented 21 demands, with free trade unions the highest priority. But the committee wisely did not threaten the regime politically by asking for free elections. Ignoring rumblings from the Soviets and squeezed by growing economic pressures, the regime bowed to expediency and agrees to free unions, wage increases, and limits on censorship.
Calling itself "Solidarity," the movement decided to expand its charter At its first national congress in the fall of 1981, an Action Program promoted "self-management" in all areas of society including the establishment of democratic local governments, independent judges, and equal protection under the law. Against Walesa's advice, Solidarity called for a national day of protest, coupled with an inflammatory referendum amounting to a vote of "no confidence" in General Jaruzelski and the Party. Under Soviet pressure, the state suspended free unions, arrested Walesa and most of Solidarity's national commission, and gaged the media.
A new generation of striking workers accelerated the final breakdown. After several years of underground resistance by Solidarity, the Communists were forced to invite Solidarity to help them reconstruct the Polish nation on the basis of a different, multiparty democratic model.
The Movement of Chilean copper miners
The national protest days led by Chilean copper miners in 1983, which overcame a decade of paralyzing fear, showed that public opposition to the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet was possible, and signaled the start of a nonviolent democratic opposition. Brutally repressed, opposition forces persisted and eventually removed Pinochet's military government in a 1988 referendum.
On May 11,1983, the capital city of the South American nation of Chile exploded in protest. Santiago citizens marched in the streets, blared their car horns, and clanged pots and pans from apartment windows. The day marked an end to the decade-long acquiescence to the rule of General Augusto Pinochet, who had seized power in 1973 from the elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. The junta had declared the entire nation an emergency zone and imposed a state of siege that limited the rights of citizens and augmented the military's powers. It shut down three of the country's newspapers, placed universities under military administration, and prohibited singing in public.
In the ten years prior to the national protest, Pinochet's anti-communism and free-market economic policies won him the support of moderate politicians and middle-class Chileans, while his use of terror (3,000 supporters of the Allende regime were killed or missing) managed to all but silence his opponents. In the early 1980s, however, a recession - spurred by declining copper prices - sapped the country's prosperity. Working-class and middle-class citizens, in concert with leftist and moderate leaders, rallied behind a strike by the powerful copper miners' union and projected dissent into the promenades and avenues of Santiago. For the next three years, an eclectic mix of opposition groups joined to organize monthly "days of protest" and demanded a return to democracy. Human rights organizations, unions, student groups, women's groups, and traditional political parties all took part, using a range of tactics that include strikes, work slowdowns, and school boycotts. By 1986, however, the radical left added violence to the anti-Pinochet protest, discouraging middle class participation and justifying the dictator's continued repression.
When Pinochet decided to go ahead with a plebiscite (ordained by his own constitution) on whether he should remain in office, the opposition decided to challenge him at the polls. It deftly organized a determined and sophisticated campaign to defeat Pinochet. Led by Gennaro Arriagada, the "Command for No" movement coordinated an army of volunteers to register voters and persuade fearful citizens to participate. Also crucial was an influx of foreign funds that paid for opinion polls, media consultants, poll watchers, and computers, which allowed the opposition to conduct its own vote count and circumvent electoral fraud by the regime.
Despite relentless harassment against "No" campaign operatives, on October 5,1988,55 percent of voters came forward to cast ballots to end Pinochet's reign of terror. Victorious, the "Command for No" movement evolved into a multiparty coalition that won parliamentary elections the next year, completing the restoration of democracy in Chile after 15 authoritarian years.
When Pinochet decided to go ahead with a plebiscite (ordained by his own constitution) on whether he should remain in office, the opposition decided to challenge him at the polls. It deftly organized a determined and sophisticated campaign to defeat Pinochet. Led by Gennaro Arriagada, the "Command for No" movement coordinated an army of volunteers to register voters and persuade fearful citizens to participate. Also crucial was an influx of foreign funds that paid for opinion polls, media consultants, poll watchers, and computers, which allowed the opposition to conduct its own vote count and circumvent electoral fraud by the regime.
Despite relentless harassment against "No" campaign operatives, on October 5,1988,55 percent of voters came forward to cast ballots to end Pinochet's reign of terror. Victorious, the "Command for No" movement evolved into a multiparty coalition that won parliamentary elections the next year, completing the restoration of democracy in Chile after 15 authoritarian years.
The Philippine struggle
In the mid-1980's a popular movement sprang up to oust the corrupt Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos. As the resistance gained momentum, two key military officers defected from the government and sequestered themselves inside a Manila military base. What followed was an amazing example of nonviolent struggle as hundreds of thousands of ordinary Filipinos took to the streets to protect the rebel officers from troops still loyal to Marcos.
What the story of the Philippine revolution demonstrates is the power people can have when they withdraw consent.
The Civilian resistance of Czechoslovakia
In 1968 the Soviet Union and four other Communist countries invaded Czechoslovakia. Rather than defending themselves militarily, the Czechoslovakian people responded with nonviolent resistance. This piece described some of the nonviolent tactics they used in an attempt to thwart Soviet objectives. There were also some comments on how the Czechoslovakians could have used nonviolence more effectively, the vulnerabilities of bureaucratic systems, and the practicality of using strategic nonviolence for national defense (civilian-based defense).
The story of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a testament to the power of civilian resistance and the limitations of military force. Even when the country was bristling with Warsaw Pact troops and military equipment, in no way could it be said the Soviets were in control of Czechoslovakia.
Energizers of the nonviolence doctrine: conceptualizations
Mohandas K. Gandhi was not a researcher in the style of today's scholars and he never sought to publish his work in scholarly journals. Nevertheless, it is worth looking at Gandhi's contributions through the lens of research.
Gandhi made several lasting contributions to nonviolence. His personal example and his leadership of the Indian independence movement provided inspiration for activists and intellectuals alike, a process of inspiration that continues today. Also vitally important was Gandhi's conceptualisation of nonviolent action and its deployment as a planned method for social change. People had used methods of nonviolent action long before Gandhi. He, more than anyone else, combined theory and practice. Gandhi was committed to nonviolence on ethical grounds, an approach now commonly called principled nonviolence, though he had a astute eye for what would work in practice.
Gandhi subtitled his autobiography "The story of my experiments with truth," and there is definitely a sense in which he was an experimentalist. Gandhi produced a vast amount of writing, but did not systematise his ideas. Therefore, it seems reasonable to say that Gandhi's work was primarily oriented to activists. He was not interested in academic research.
Gandhi declined the opportunity to be the political leader of newly independent India, but he groomed his key followers to make government policy along nonviolence lines. Aside from President Rajendra Prasad, they dropped any commitment to pursuing Gandhian policies as soon as they were in power. It could be said that Gandhi had hopes of influencing policy but had not developed tools for doing so.
Richard Gregg was one of Gandhi's many followers and admirers. Spending some time working with Gandhi, he took on the task of expounding Gandhi's ideas and practice for other audiences. Gregg's book The Power of Nonviolence, first published in 1934, is an impressive exposition and interpretation of Gandhi's methods, aimed at Western audiences, augmented by Gregg's own insights. He covered examples of nonviolent action, the effectiveness of mass nonviolent action, nonviolence as a substitute for war, nonviolence and the state, and nonviolence training.
For a closer look, let me focus on just one element in Gregg's book: the concept of moral jiu-jitsu. When a nonviolent activist - a satyagrahi in Gandhi's terms - comes under attack, for example being beaten by police, and maintains nonviolent discipline, this can generate support for the nonviolent activist. According to Gregg, nonviolence shows respect for the opponent's integrity, thereby putting the attacker to shame and impressing onlookers, who may be won over. By analogy to the sport of jiu-jitsu, in which the opponent's strength is used to destabilise them, Gregg says that nonviolence causes the attacker to lose moral balance while the defender maintains it, thus producing what he terms moral jiu-jitsu.
Gregg's analysis is along the lines of Gandhi's: both of them see nonviolence working through psychological processes. Gregg added a coherent explanation, references to the psychological literature and a descriptive name. What is lacking is any evidence of the psychological effects of nonviolent action. Years later, Thomas Weber re-examined the jiu-jitsu process in Gandhi's 1930 salt march. When satyagrahis came forward to be beaten by lathi-wielding police, this apparently did not lead to a psychological transformation in the police. Some of them became angry at the lack of resistance by the protesters, redoubling their attacks. Weber says that the attacks triggered outrage by third parties around the world who were informed through eloquent news reports by journalist Webb Miller. Contrary to Gregg's idea that nonviolence works primarily through direct psychological effects on attackers, Weber found that the main effect, in this instance at least, was through influence on third parties. Dennis Dalton, another Gandhian scholar, documented the effects of Gandhi's campaign on British officials. According to Dalton, the salt march brilliantly exploited Brish ambivalence by appealing to individuals' higher sentiments (such as Lord Irwin's religious beliefs), by presenting the cause sympathetically to moderates and by putting the British in a lose-lose situation: either toleration, with the independence movement making advances, or repression leading to a backlash. These more recent works show both the limitations of Gregg's analysis and the value of his framework as a foundation for further investigation.
Gregg's book is relevant to both activists and scholars. For activists, it presents Gandhi's method in a more systematic form than Gandhi ever did. For scholars, it lays out a conceptual framework for nonviolent action. Being firmly in the Gandhian tradition of principled nonviolence, Gregg's approach has little appeal for policy makers.
Stephen King-Hall was a British naval officer, intelligence officer, playwright, member of parliament and iconoclastic commentator on British foreign policy. Just before the outbreak of World War II, he advocated sending messages directly to the German people in an attempt to undermine support for Hitler. Gaining no support from the British government, he financed a private effort along these lines which, at least according to King-Hall, had considerable impact.
In 1958, King-Hall's book Defence in the Nuclear Age was published. He argued that the rise of nuclear weapons had made conventional military defence obsolete and instead argued for British nuclear disarmament - unilateral if necessary - and nonviolent resistance should the country be occupied. Unlike pioneering peace researchers arguing for nonviolent defence - all of whom explicitly derived ideas from the nonviolence tradition - King-Hall was primarily concerned about the communist threat and derived his radical conclusions from a pragmatic analysis of the implications of nuclear weapons. He was quite uncritical of the "western way of life" which he saw as the central thing to be defended. One of the core elements of this way of life, as he saw it, was British parliamentary democracy.
King-Hall's unconventional approach to nonviolent defence led him to make some innovative proposals. He suggested, for example, that Khrushchev could have been invited to appear on television with the British prime minister, who would then invite 100,000 Soviet citizens to live with British families in their homes for two weeks, seeing the western way of life, at British expense. If Khrushchev had refused this generous public offer, then this rejection could have been publicised, especially in the Soviet Union. If he had accepted, then the visitors' commitment to communism would have been undermined, or so King-Hall assumed. This is a type of international diplomacy with fraternisation as the underlying method.
King-Hall's book was aimed squarely at policy makers. Though generating some discussion, it essentially represented a cry in the wilderness given the low receptivity of western governments to a recommendation to renounce nuclear weapons and rely on nonviolent defence. King-Hall did not orient his recommendations to activists, and academics were even further from his concerns, so it is perhaps not surprising that his book did not become the foundation for future research. It did show, though, that nonviolence need not be the province only of activists: as nonviolent defence, it could be treated as a serious policy option.
Gene Sharp is widely recognised as the world's leading nonviolence researcher. Among his many contributions are the documentation and classification of hundreds of different methods of nonviolent action. He also spelled out a framework for the dynamics of nonviolent action, with a series of typical stages: laying the groundwork for nonviolent action; making challenges, which usually brings on repression; maintaining solidarity and discipline to oppose repression; political jiu-jitsu; achieving success through conversion, accommodation or nonviolent coercion; and redistributing power.
Whereas Gandhi was unsystematic in his observations and analysis, Sharp is relentlessly thorough, most distinctively so in his epic book The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Sharp's classification of methods of nonviolent action uses three main categories - symbolic action, non-cooperation, and intervention - various subcategories, such as strikes and boycotts as types of non-cooperation, and then numerous specific methods such as farm workers' strikes and traders' boycotts. For each method, Sharp provides brief historical examples plus references.
Another important contribution by Sharp is his use of the consent theory of power as the theoretical foundation for nonviolent action. In essence, this theory proposes that the key to the power of rulers is the consent or acquiescence of their subjects: if that consent or acquiescence is withdrawn, the ruler's power dissolves. Although others had argued along the same general lines previously, Sharp gave it a more prominent and practical role.
Though significantly influenced by Gandhi, Sharp broke with him in a major way. Whereas Gandhi advocated nonviolence as a moral imperative, Sharp advocates nonviolence as more effective than violence. These positions are commonly called principled nonviolence and pragmatic nonviolence respectively. Sharp's pragmatic approach can be considered an adaptation to western culture, where the basis for widespread principled commitment to nonviolence seems to be lacking.
Sharp has oriented some of his work squarely at policy makers, especially his writings on nonviolent defence or, to use his preferred expression, civilian-based defence. His argument that nonviolence is pragmatically superior can be interpreted as an appeal to policy makers - especially in the US, his primary target audience - to rationally consider options and to choose the more effective option. Though there has been some polite attention and the occasional enthusiastic support, by and large Sharp's ideas seem to have had minimal impact on US defence policy. One explanation for this is that for US policy elites, maintaining the military and state apparatus is a higher priority than, or a precondition for, considering effectiveness.
Sharp has also oriented his writings to scholars. This is apparent, for example, in the care he takes in documenting historical sources and in listing prior theoretical work relevant to the consent theory of power. Although Sharp's works are widely known to and regularly cited by nonviolence scholars, he has been virtually ignored in mainstream disciplines such as political science. It is still possible to read accounts of nonviolent struggles without so much as a mention of Sharp or any other nonviolence scholar. Part of the reason may be that Sharp did not often publish in mainstream disciplinary journals outside peace research. More fundamentally, his approach is at odds with dominant frameworks in academic social science.
Sharp has personally inspired and advised nonviolent activists in numerous countries around the world, but his substantial writings are not explicitly oriented to activists. Especially in his policy-relevant work on civilian-based defence, he does not want this alternative to be seen as the special agenda of social movements, such as socialism and feminism, since this might taint it in the eyes of policy makers. Ironically, though, it is among activists that Sharp has had by far his greatest impact; years ago I suggested that Sharp has had more influence on social activists than any other living theorist. This is due to the very practical nature of his classificatory framework, its inspirational value deriving from so many historical examples, and the consent theory of power that offers activists an explicit warrant for bringing about change.
Alex P. Schmid in 1985 produced a comprehensive analysis of Social Defence and Soviet Military Power, in which he concluded that "the Soviet military power instrument cannot be balanced by economic noncooperation and cultural persuasion alone as the USSR is economically invulnerable and culturally impenetrable." In other words, social defence - another term for nonviolent defence or civilian-based defence - would not work against a Soviet military invasion. The research was funded by the Dutch government, the only project that proceeded out of a whole series of projects originally planned. Social Defence and Soviet Military Power contains a short survey of concepts of nonviolent action and social defence, an examination of Soviet military interventions and nuclear threats since 1945, four case studies of East European resistance to Soviet domination, and an assessment of social defence as a component of a national defence system.
Schmid's analysis is important as one of the few sustained investigations undertaken without an obvious sympathy for nonviolence, thereby allowing articulation of insights that would be uncomfortable for scholars such as Gregg or Sharp. One important point made by Schmid is that in many struggles, the outcome depends primarily on the international configuration of power, with the method used - violent or nonviolent - being of lesser significance. The Lithuanian partisan resistance against Soviet re-occupation, from 1944 to about 1952, is a case in point: without Western intervention, the partisans had little hope of success.
This cool-headed examination stands in contrast to the more familiar approach by nonviolence scholars of highlighting success stories - such as toppling the 1920 Kapp Putsch in Germany, resistance to the Nazi occupation in Norway and the Netherlands, the US civil rights movement and the Czechoslovak resistance to the 1968 Soviet invasion - and ignoring or downplaying both the problematical features of these examples as well as other examples where nonviolence had only limited success.
In order to develop the case for social defence, it could help to scrutinise the arguments of critics, so Social Defence and Soviet Military Power has a special value given that few careful critiques exist. Four assumptions made by Schmid are open to question: that social defence is necessarily national defence (rather than both a local and a transnational process), that social defence has no offensive capacity, that social defence must substitute for all the strengths of military defence, and that social defence would be introduced without any other significant changes in society. Given the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes, it is easy now to dismiss Schmid's assessment, but it would be to throw away all potential insights just because some assessments were wrong.
Schmid's treatment was aimed at policy makers, in particular in the Netherlands, though it may be that the book's negative assessment of social defence was redundant and that even a glowing endorsement would not have led to serious government attention. The book is scholarly in construction but seems to have received little attention from nonviolence or other scholars. Finally, the book is definitely not aimed at activists and they have shown no interest in it.
Robert Burrowes would be considered by many to have been Australia's leading nonviolent activist in the 1990s. He was an inspiring presence in the Melbourne-based Rainforest Action Group, a shrewd strategist and a key networker at a national level. He took a highly principled position and promoted it astutely. For example, when refusing to pay the portion of his income tax that would go to the military, he instead delivered shovels - symbols of constructive work - to the taxation office in a symbolically potent act of resistance.
Burrowes read widely in the nonviolence literature and undertook a PhD. His thesis, in revised form, was published in 1996 as The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach. The title indicates his distinctive contribution: a Gandhian approach that deals with strategy, in particular for defence. Among the innovations in the book is a reassessment of the political purpose and strategic aims of nonviolent defence. Richard Gregg may have been the first to apply Clausewitz's ideas about strategy to a nonviolent struggle; this was done much more thoroughly by Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack in their book War Without Weapons. Boserup and Mack concluded that the strategic aim is maintaining the unity of the resistance. Later, Gene Keyes decided instead that the strategic aim should be maintaining the morale of the resistance. For Burrowes, though, the strategic aim of the resistance is "to consolidate the power and will of the defending population to resist the aggression" and the strategic aim of the counteroffensive is "to alter the will of the opponent elite to conduct the aggression, and to undermine their power to do so." This combination of will and power might be taken to reflect a combination of Gandhi's emphasis on moral persuasion and Sharp's emphasis on nonviolent coercion.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Ashe, Geoffrey, GANDHI, NY: Stein and Day, 1968.
2. Bondurant, Joan, CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE, University of California Press, 1965. A good political analysis of Gandhian nonviolence.
3. Cooney, Robert, and Michalowski, Helen, eds. THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE, New Society Publishers, 1986. History of nonviolent actions and acfivitists in U.S.
4. Coover, Deacon, Esser, Moore, RESOURCE MANUAL FOR A LIVING REVOLUTION, NewSoceity Publishers, 1984. Ways to analyze and improve group dynamics and exercises for developing strategies.
5. Deming, Barbara, ON ANGER, A. J.Muste Institute, one of the series of pamphlets on nonviolent action, available from 339 Lafayette St. New York, NY 10012
6. PRISON NOTES, NY: Grossman, 1966.
7. REVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM, NY: Grossman Publishers, 1971.
8. Essays analyzing nonviolent action from a feminist and pacifist perspective.
9. WE CANNOT LIVE WITHOUT OUR LIVES, NY: Grossman, 1974.
10. Douglass, James RESISTANCE AND CONTEMPLATION, Doubleday, 1972. A vision of nonviolent revolution based on Gandhian and Christian radicalism.
11. Gandhi, Mohandas K., NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE, Schocken Books, 1962, A collection of essays. Garland, Anne Witte, WOMEN ACTIVISTS CHALLENGING THE ABUSE OF POWER, the Feminist Press, 1988.
12. Gregg, Richard, THE POWER OF NONVIOLENCE, 1966. Study and explanation of psychology of nonviolence.
13. Harding, Rosemarie and Vincent, WE MUST KEEP GOING, MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA, New Society Publishers, 1989.
14. Hedemann, Ed (ed.) WAR RESIS TERS LEAGUE ORGANIZERS
15. MANUAL, War Resisters League, 1981. Practical information and details on organizing actions and local activities.
16. King, Martin Luther, Jr., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? NY: Bantam Books, 1967.
17. WHY WE CAN'T WAIT, New York: SignetBooks, 1964.
18. STRENGTH TO LOVE, New York: Harper and Row, 1967.
19. THE TRUMPET OF CONSCIENCE, New York: Harper and Row, 1967.
20. STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM, New York: Harper and Row, 1958.
21. Lemoux, Penny, CRY OF THE PEOPLE, Penguin Books, 1982.
22. Lynd, Staughton, NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY OF HISTORY, Indianapolis: BobbsMen-ill, 1966.
23. McAllister, Pam, (ed) REWEAVING THE WEB OF LIFE, New Society Publishers, 1982. Essays of feminism and nonviolence.
24. YOU CAN'T KILL THE SPIRIT, New Society Publishers, 1988.
25. Stories of women and nonviolence. Merton, Thomas GANDHI AND NONVIOLENCE, New Directions, 1965. Selected excerpts with commentary by editor.
26. Meyerding, Jane (ed), WE ARE ALL PART OF ONE ANOTHER, A BAR BARA DEMING READER, New Society Publishers, 1984.
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28. Patton, Cindy, SEX AND GERMS, THE POLICY OF AIDS, South End Press, 1985.
29. Piven and Cloward, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL, Random House, 1977.
30. Sharp, Gene, THE POLITICS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION, Porter Sargent, 1973. A detailed 3-volume analysis of political power and discussion of specific methods of nonviolence.
31. Thoreau, Henry David, ON THE DUTY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, 1948.
32. Zinn, Howard, SNCC: THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS, Boston: Beacon Press, 1965.
33. Syracuse Women's Affinity Group blockades the airstrip at the Seneca Army Depot. October 1983. Photo by Burr Lewis, - 1983.
