Anekanta : Philosophy of Co-existence: 06.06 The Doctrine of Nayas - The Etymological Viewpoint (samabhirūdhanaya)

Published: 26.07.2010
Updated: 28.07.2010

Chapter 6

The Doctrine of Nayas: Infinite Modes and Infinite Approaches


The Etymological Viewpoint

Samabhirūdhanaya

This viewpoint of etymology is much subtler than the verbal viewpoint. The synonymous words, according to this viewpoint, have different meanings, and they do not stand for an identical referent. For linguistic exactness we use specific words to connote specific modes. The practice of bracketing synonyms followed in the vocabularies is a defective method according to this viewpoint. Each word has a shade of its own which makes it irreplaceable by any other word, however close its connotation may be. A morphological difference in a word presupposes a corresponding difference in the meaning intended by the speaker. No two words can be used to denote the selfsame referent. Such use would involve confusion and contradiction. The power of expression should vary from word to word because the absence of variation would obliterate the morphological distinction of the words. Consequently the two words should be admitted as one single verbal symbol. It is, therefore, asserted by this etymological viewpoint that the use of different words should be governed by the difference in the meaning sought to be expressed by them.

The problem of the relation between word and meaning (ideas and things) is worthy of consideration in this connection. Word and meaning are quite distinct entities. Their causal efficiencies are distinct. The conditions of their productions are different.

Word and its meaning stand in the relation of significant and significate. The significant is the word, sign or symbol while the significate is the thing or the idea meant by the significant. There cannot be the relation of identity between the significant and the significate and, therefore, how can diversity of the significate follow from the diversity of the significant?

The solution of the problem can be sought in the light of the words like cognition-cognitum and the luminous objects like the sun, the lamp etc.

  1. There is no relation of identity between a cognition and its cognitum although the former is the determinant of the latter. Now, if the knower-known relationship can be admitted between the cognition and the cognitum in spite of their (epistemological) difference, what is the difficulty in accepting the denotatum-denotative relationship between a word and the thing (meant by the word), in spite of their (ontological) difference?

  2. It is common sense that the luminous objects like the sun, the lamp etc. illuminate a pot and other things, though they ase Physically different from one another. But, if there can exist rilumined-illuminator relationship between a pot and a lamp in spite of their (ontological) difference, then what is the reason that the denotatum-denotative relationship cannot be obtained between them?

Therefore, as there exists the denotative-denotatum relationship between a word and the thing, it is self-evident that there should be a difference of meaning denoted, consequent upon the difference of the denotative word. This difference of meaning resulting from the difference of word can be illustrated by the following propositions:

  1. He is moral.
  2. He is a man

The expressions 'moral' and 'man' are synonymous, but they represent different modes of the same entity, and as such they do not have an identical referent as explained below:

  1. A man is mortal and, therefore, he is represented by the term 'mortal'. The expression 'mortal' expresses the mortality-aspect of a man.
  2. A man is so called because he is the descendant of Manu. The word has a reference to his descent from a certain person, named Manu.

Similarly in the propositions (a) it is the current of Bhāgīrathi and (b) it is the source of Hairnavati, the expressions 'Bhāgirathi' and 'Haimavat? refer to the selfsame Ganges, but stress two different modes that have reference to the origin of the river. The first term refers to the myth of Bhāgīrathā digging up the bed of the Ganges, whereas the second expression refers to the physical origin of the Ganges from the Himalayas.

Sources

Anekanta: Philosophy of Co-existence Publisher:  JainVishwa Bharati, Ladnun, Rajasthan, India Editor: Muni Akshay Prakash

Edition:  2010 (1. Edition)

ISBN:  817195140-6

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