Dr. Samani Shashi Pragya
Jaina Nayavāda vis-a-vis Husserl's Phenomenology
The Phenomenologist Husserl’s (1859-1938) philosophical investigations are directed to the search for absolute or universally valid truths.The central motive of Husserl’s philosophical endeavour is the search for certainty.[1] of He is a sharp critique of relativism. Relativism, Husserl thinks, leads to a decline in our confidence in our rational certainty. He says, “If truth is relative, being dependent on historical, cultural or psychological context or background, then it will differ with the difference of context. The ultimate result will be the difference of opinion with regard to truth. This will result in skepticism, where social discord and turmoil will be the final outcome. According to Husserl, this crisis ultimately leads us to look for truth as something context independent as a way out of this crisis.
Jainism is a philosophy of non-absolutism and relative pluralism. Jain thinkers will never agree with Husserl that relativism constitutes the crisis of the age. On the contrary, they will emphatically urge that it is rather the other way round. To them, relativism, instead of being the root cause of the crisis of man, is the way out and the only way out of all sorts of crisis that befall us. It is the absolutistic conception of truth irrespective of the consideration of viewpoints which, the Jains will forcefully say, is at the root of all the crisis of human civilization. Objects of our knowledge, according to Jains, have inexhaustible facets or aspects, and it is impossible for us, except, of course, in the case of kevaljñāni, to know directly all the aspects of an object. Along with this, we cannot even exhaustively express all the multi-dimensional characteristics of particular object. These are the central points of difference concerning methodology and the outlook between the Jain and the Husserlian viewpoint.
Naya deals with a particular aspect of an object,which the cognizer has in view.It is an opinion or viewpoint expressive of a partial truth of the object i.e., jñāturābhiprāya and vastvainśagrāhī.[2] How then can one retrieve the total knowledge of object as given at the very outset in intuition? To have the total knowledge in terms of the nayas seems impossible because the nayas are not only numerous, but infinite in number. In the āgama literature, we get ample elucidation of anekāntavāda and syādvāda. Words of Jina are never indifferent to naya. Every Sentence of āgama is explained through nayas. The object in its wholeness is known through valid cognition (pramāna) in the first stance, and subsequently the same object is cognized in parts through the nayas (viewpoints). All our knowledge is synthetic in the beginning, and becomes analytic at the next stage.There must thus be some way of abridging all these infinite viewpoints and constructing a total and compact view of reality. There must be a way of making a saṃk·epa or samāsa of the views. But a word can convey only one characteristic at a particular time and in this way, words can express the characteristics of reality only successively. The full scale and simultaneous expression of all the characteristics of reality is never possible by language.[3] This view is parallel with the Jain view of avaktavya or inexplicable.[4]
It is for this reason that the Jains divided nayas into dravyārthika naya (substantial naya) and paryāyārthika naya (modal naya). Dravyārthika naya is one which is concerned with the substantial aspect of an object i.e. the generic and the permanent aspect of an object. For example, Clay is the substance of a pot. Whatever is done to the pot, clay remains the same as something indestructible and permanent. When we consider a pot from the point of view of clay, we are availing ourselves of the substantial naya. Paryāyārthika naya means that viewpoint, which deals only with the modes or modifications of a thing or substance. Thus when we consider the pot from the viewpoint of its form, we consider particular modifications of clay.[5]
Jaina pontiffs also agree naya as anirākṛtetarāṃśo vastvaṃśagrāhi pratipattura-bhiprāyo nayaḥ[6]. It means, naya is a viewpoint expressing the intention of the speaker (knower), which takes cognizance of a particular (intended) aspect of object, apprehended through pramāṇa, a valid organ of knowledge and which does not repudiate the other aspects of that reality. Husserl also says the same thing. When we look at an object, what we get in relation to our viewpoint is only one aspect of the object. The viewpoint or the act of consciousness is called the noesis and the partial presentation of the object as revealed in the consciousness is called the noema. Therefore, Husserl’s conception of noesis is strictly parallel to the Jain concept of naya. Noesis has been defined as a meaning-giving intention and the Jain view of naya has been defined as Jñāturābhipraya[7]i.e. abhiprāya or intention of the knower. Noesis gives only a partial presentation (or noema) of the object, similar is the case with naya. Now according to Husserl, noesis with regards to an object are infinite in number so also are the cases of naya. Nayas are also infinite in number. In this respect Husserl can also say the same thing like the Jains without embracing any inconsistency viz. anantadharmakam vastu, In strict Husserlian terms, this can be couched as follows: an object as phenomenon has infinitely manifold noematic aspects.
Again, when Husserl says that object, as a system of innumerable noemata corresponding to innumerable noesis, is accessible to the knower through a noematic nucleus, he merely echoes with the view of the Jains in this regard.Objects are givenwith an essential onesidedness because of the perspectivism…This onesidedness is exhibited not only in the totality of evidence of the real and objective world,but also in every particular object in it.[8] Substantial viewpoint or dravyārthika naya in Jainism is thus, parallel to what in Husserlian language is called a noematic nucleus. This, the Jain call, abhedavṛtti.[9] Further when Husserl says that the noematic nucleus contains within itself in the form of horizon, the hints of all the possible noemata, this also seems to be in agreement with the Jains view. A dravya contains within itself the possibility of all the paryāyas. So there is no contradiction in accepting the view that the substantial view point foreshadows the possibility of all the paryāyas that a substance can assume in the form of horizon, as the noematic nucleus, implicitly contains all the paryāyas. Dravyārthic naya contains all the paryāya naya-s as hints.
In this respect there is the basis for a point of identity between the different characteristics. And lastly, Husserl says, nothing new when he asserts, that full knowledge of an object,as a system of infinite noemata is never possible, that each noema in its reference to other noemata gives us only an idea of the object in its totality and that the ultimate unity of perception is never a matter of experience, but always remains an ideal, except the case of kevalins and not in respect of the ordinary knower.[10] The Jain thinkers also hold the same view. We may thus conclude tha,t the Jain thinking, when divested of its natural realistic attitude, can easily be susceptible to phenomenological interpretation and can be said to express the views very close to and almost identical with that of Husserl.
