Prabhācandra’s Status In The History Of Jaina Philosophy

International Journal of Jaina Studies
(Online) Vol. 9, No. 8 (2013) 1-13

Abstract

In dealing with the history of Jaina philosophical speculation after the age of the Āgamas, K. K. Dixit in his now well-known 1971 work Jaina Ontology (pp. 88-164) conveniently divides the specu­lations into three stages which he calls the “Ages of Logic”. It is Prabhācandra, one of the thinkers of the third stage (apart from Abhayadeva, Vādideva and Yaśovijaya) which concerns the content of this paper, because Dixit makes contrary statements about him. On the one hand, he says that “the range of Prabhācandra’s enquiry was less comprehensive than that of Vidyānanda and his treatment of topics less advanced than that of the latter” (p. 103). And, on the other hand, on p. 156, he says that Prabhācandra “had made it a point to introduce in his commentaries an exhaustive and systematic discussion of the major philosophical issues of his times” (even including aspects not found in his predecessors, e.g. theories of error).

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Prabhācandra’s Status In The History Of Jaina Philosophy

In his now well-known 1971 work Jaina Ontology, K. K. Dixit very conveniently divides the history of Jaina philosophical speculation into three so-called "Ages of Logic" (88–164), after having dealt with the "Age of the Āgamas" (12–87). The word "logic" in the "Ages of Logic" may be understood as the logic of the arguments by Jaina thinkers in different periods or ages, namely their arguments both against non-Jaina views as well as those in support of their own position on philosophical issues. The ages are divided chronologically in terms of important texts by renowned thinkers.

Dixit seems to want to clearly demarcate Śvetāmbara and Digambara contributions in the different ages, so in the first period the important Śvetāmbara texts, he says on p. 89 are: Siddhasena's (c. 5th century) Sanmati, Mallavādin's (5th or 6th century) Naya-cakra and Jinabhadra's (6th or 7th century) Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya. And the first important Digambara texts of this first period are Kundakunda's (2nd or 8th century?) three sāras (Pañcāsti-kāya, Pravacana and Samaya) and Samantabhadra's (4th century) Āpta-mīmāṃsā (p. 99: this text: "was rather poor in content, though brilliant in form"!).

The second stage is represented by the 8th century Śvetāmbara scholar-monk Haribhadra with his Anekānta-jayapatākā, his magnum opus, and his Śāstravārtā- samuccaya) and the Digambaras Akalaṅka (8th century, Rāja-vārtika, Aṣṭaśatī, Laghīyas-traya, Nyāya-viniścaya, Pramāṇa-saṅgraha and Siddhi-viniścaya) and Vidyānanda [Vidyānandin] (9th century, Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika and Aṣṭa-sahasrī), the last of this stage.

The third stage is represented by the Digambara Prabhācandra (11 th century, Nyāyakumuda-candra, a commentary on Akalaṅka's 8th century Laghīyas-traya, and Prameyakamala-mārtaṇḍa, a commentary on Māṇikyanandin's 11 th century Parīkṣā- mukha), the Śvetāmbaras Abhayadeva (also 11 th century, Sanmati-ṭīkā), Vādideva (12th century, Syādvāda-ratnākara) and Yaśovijaya (17th century, Naya-rahasya, Anekāntavyavasthā, Nayo-padeśa [on anekāntavāda] and Tarka-bhāṣā and Jñāna-bindu [on pramāṇa]).

It is significant that the Digambara Prabhācandra is the first in the third stage, because he would be the link from the second stage to those who came after him. So, for example Vādideva's Syād-vāda-ratnākara resembles Prabhācandra's PKM closely.

The threefold division of the ages of logic, in contrast to the age of the Āgamas, is based on the view that certain tendencies characterise the age of logic. These are:

1. to vindicate the doctrine of anekāntavāda

2. to establish a particular doctrine of pramāṇas

3. to evaluate the non-Jaina philosophical views

4. to defend the traditional Jaina philosophical views (Dixit, p. 106).

All this means that the age of Logic is divisible into three parts, viz.:

1. that related to the doctrine of anekāntavāda

2. that related to the doctrine of pramāṇas

3. that related to the traditional Jaina philosophical views (Dixit, p. 107).

This threefold division of the age of logic takes into account 12 thinkers and 25 works from about the fourth to the seventeenth centuries. The advantage of this classification is that it groups together a specific number of thinkers and texts in order to facilitate an over-view of Jaina speculation on specific themes directly or indirectly related to Jaina ontology, namely a vindication of anekāntavāda, the development of the doctrine of pramāṇas and a defence of traditional Jaina philosophical views. That the scheme is practical may be seen in the fact that although Māṇikyanandin's 11 th century Parīkṣā-mukha is conspicuous by its absence, Prabhācandra's Prameya-kamalamārtaṇḍa in the third age is mentioned, which is a commentary on it. One could argue that the scheme is an over-simplification of thirteen centuries of Jaina speculation and disregards a vast amount of speculation by other thinkers. This would no doubt be true. If thinkers are left out (e.g. Māṇikyanandin, just mentioned) and many important works ignored (Vidyānandin's Satya-śāsana-parīkṣā and Āpta-parīkṣā), we certainly get a limited picture. In other words, Dixit's work has to be consulted with caution and exhaustive supplementation. Moreover, many of Dixit's remarks have to be carefully weighed in the light of their contrariness and opinionatedness, as for example in the case of Prabhācandra.

Some Statements about Prabhācandra in K. K. Dixit's Jaina Ontology

102: "The Digambara author who followed Vidyānanda was Prabhācandra and as has already been hinted [?] he was an inferior genius as compared to the former."

"102: Prabhācandra too [like Vidyānanda] surveys the contemporary philosophical scene in the light of Akalaṅka's discoveries but his insights had its limitations. The result was that Vidyānanda gave us two of the most advanced philosophical texts coming from the pen of a Jaina [Tattvārtha- śloka-vārttika and Aṣṭa-sahasrī] while Prabhācandra gave us two text-books to be used by fairly gifted school-boys [Nyāya-kumuda-candra, a commentary on Akalaṅka's 8th century Laghīyas-traya and Prameyakamala-mārtaṇḍa, a commentary on Māṇikyanandin's 11 th century Parīkṣā- mukha]."

"103: But certainly the range of Prabhācandra's enquiry was less comprehensive than that of Vidyānanda and his treatment of topics less advanced than that of the latter. As a matter of fact, a study of Prabhācandra is a good preparation for that of Vidyānanda, that it is a good preparation argues [for] Prabhācandra's worth, that it is only a preparation argues [for] his limitation."

155: "[...] the Digambara Prabhācandra who followed Vidyānanda was a lesser author than the latter [...]."

156: "For he [Prabhācandra] made it a point to introduce in his commentaries an exhaustive and systematic discussion of the major philosophical issues of his times."

"156: [...] Prabhācandra's level of discussion is decidedly less advanced than that of Vidyānanda. Of course, two questions are somewhat new in Prabhācandra. Thus in Nyāyakumudacandra there occurs a detailed refutation of the six Vaiśeṣika padārthas and the sixteen Nyāya padārthas, the former which is more important being repeated in Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa; (in Vidyānanda such a refutation was just hinted at). Similarly in both Nyāyakumudacandra and Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa there occurs a detailed treatment of the theories of error maintained by diverse philosophical schools; (Vidyānanda is unfamiliar with this problem)."

156: "Prabhācandra's writings should serve as a good introduction to those of Vidyānanda; (Prabhācandra's writings have the advantage that they contain one discussion at one place)."

157: "[...] Nyāyakumudacandra is to be studied not so much for the sake of [the] light it throws on Akalaṅka's words as for that of the independent philosophical discussions it incorporates." Before this statement in the same paragraph Dixit says on p. 157:

"A glaring example [of not throwing light on Akalaṅka's NKC] is '[...] Prabhācandra's commentary on Akalaṅka's famous verse 'jñānam ādyaṃ matiḥ sañjñā cintā cābhinibodham etc' [(AGT) Pramāṇapraveśa 10]. ^[1] Here 'matiḥ' was a wrong reading for 'smṛti' (Vidyānanda has the correct reading) and yet Prabhācandra had no difficulty in commenting on it and in the course of it in attributing an arbitrary meaning to the phrase 'jñānam ādyaṃ'."^[2]

Dixit is certainly entitled to his opinion but this last statement on p. 157 is quite a serious charge which challenges Prabhācandra's status and contribution within the Jaina tradition. The rest of the paper deals with this charge in three major points.

1. It is a moot question whether Dixit is merely repeating a point already made in the introduction (prastāvanā) by Kailāśa Candra Śāstrī to the first volume of the NKC who begs forgiveness (kṣamā) in pointing out an error (bhrama) in Prabhācandra's reference to the said stanza by Akalaṅka (see pp. 8f. there about ādya in the sense of kāraṇa). ^[3]

2. Further, and in addition to the above, the introduction by Śāstrī says that smṛti, pratyabhijñāna, tarka and anumāna are in opposition to the Jaina tradition and therefore are falsely seen as śruta and that their cause is (erroneously) seen as mati. Moreover, no one in the Jaina tradition has regarded smṛti, etc. as pratyakṣa (NKC, p. 405, line 3: smṛty-ādi-aviśadaṃ jñānaṃ śrutam ity uktam). The next point offers a possible solution to the problem.

3. In his Laghīyas-traya (Pramāṇa- Naya- and Pravacana-praveśas) Akalaṅka distinguishes not only between pratyakṣa and parokṣa, but within pratyakṣa itself he mentions three kinds: indriya, aninidriya and atīndriya kinds of pratyakṣa. In an article about "Epistemological Categories in the Akalaṅkagranthatraya" (AGT: Laghīyastraya, Nyāya-viniścayaḥ and Pramāṇa-saṅgrahaḥ) in 2002 I tried to see diagrammatically, as given below, which pramāṇa belongs where in which work, including Akalaṅka's Laghīyas-traya of which Prabhācandra's NKC is a commentary. For our purposes we shall dealt with the first part of the Laghīyas-traya, the Pramāṇapraveśa (in 29 stanzas, divided into 4 sections), and the third, Pravacana-praveśa (the Naya-praveśa need not be consulted here).

Let us look at the relevant terms in Akalaṅka's words in the AGT:

(AGT) Pramāṇapraveśa 3: pratyakṣaṃ viśadaṃ jñānaṃ mukhya-saṃvyavahārataḥ^[4] |  parokṣaṃ śeṣa-vijñānaṃ pramāṇe iti saṅgrahaḥ || 3 ||

(AGT) vivṛti to Pramāṇapraveśa 4: tatra sāṃvyavahārikam indriyānindriya-pratyakṣam | mukhyam-atīndriya-jñānam |

(AGT) vivṛti to Pravacanapraveśa 61: [...] anindriya-pratyakṣam smrti-saṃjñā-cintā- abhinibodhātmakam | [...] śrutaṃ parokṣaṃ sakala-pramāṇa-prameyeyat-tāvatsvarūpābhidhāyi bādha-rahitaṃ pramāṇa | atra arthāpatty-anumānopamānādīny-antarbhavanti |

(AGT) Pramāṇasaṅgraha 2: pratyakṣaṃ viśada-jñānaṃ tridhā śrutam aviplavam |

The vivṛti to this, with the three kinds of pratyakṣa in bold print, is:

pratyakṣaṃ viśada-jñānaṃ tattva-jñānaṃ viśadam, indriya-pratyakṣam anindriyapratyakṣam atīindrya-pratyakṣam tridhā | śrutam aviplavaṃ pratyakṣānumānāgamanimittam | parokṣaṃ pratyabhijñādi (fn.: pratyabhijñā smṛti ūha) smaraṇa-pūrvakam |

These points can be summarised diagrammatically in this way: ^[5]

The basic question now is: do both Dixit and Kailāśa Candra Śāstrī do Prabhācandra an injustice? Is it possible that Prabhācandra was a bit lackadaisical at the place concerned because he should have hinted at Akalaṅka's complicated system, especially in his Pramāṇa-praveśa? When Prabhācandra mentions pratyakṣa I wonder whether in his parsimony he simply uses the word without specifically distinguishing Kundakunda's three kinds in the vivṛti to Pravacana-praveśa 61 quoted above. What needs to be done (in another study) is to analyse Prabhācandra's text more carefully to see which pratyakṣa he is referring to or assuming, something that Kailāśa Candra Śāstrī should have probably done. In any case, Dixit's charge and the 'error' pointed out by Kailāśa Candra Śāstrī have to be reassessed in the light of Akalaṅka's own words. To close this section let me quote a part of Sarat Chandra Ghoshal's introduction on Akalaṅka from the Parīkṣāmukham by Māṇikyanandī (see also the Appendix for the entire section) for his solution to the problem:

"Now, to meet the argument that if we take Mati as Pratyakṣa we must say that the traditional acceptance of the view that it is Parokṣa is denied undermining the oldest authorities like Umāsvāmī, Akalaṅka has written that Mati, Smriti, Samjñā, Chintā, and Abhinibodha will be Pratyakṣa so long as these (p. xxi) remain in the mental state. The moment these are connected with words i.e. are expressed in words they will become Parokṣa.^[6] Thus, Akalaṅka has accepted Mati etc. as Pratyakṣa in one sense and Parokṣa in another sense. According to Akalaṅka śruta is what is heard and the knowledge having no connection with words is Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa" (Ghoshal 1940: xx f.).

Prabhācandra's Works

Dixit notes only two works by Prabhācandra (who follows in the footsteps of Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin) that have left an indelible mark of his contribution to the history of Jaina philosophy. These are 1. the PKM, a commentary on Māṇikyanandin's Parīkṣā- mukha and 2. the NKC, a commentary on Akalaṅka's Laghīyas-traya. The PKM is certainly earlier than the NKC, as Trikha (2012: 139), has pointed out: in NKC 339, 6f. Prabhācandra says that the argument he mentions there is to be found in his PKM.

In order to see more comprehensively Prabhācandra's versatile learning, it is useful to note his other works. In addition to the two works mentioned above Prabhācandra is credited with at least the following (see also PKM 13 and Mahaprajna 1984: 171):

3. Tattvārtha-vṛtti-pada-vivaraṇa: A commentary on Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi, itself a commentary on Umāsvāti's Tattvārtha-sūtra.

4. Śabdāmbhoja-bhāskara-vṛtti: A commentary on Pūjyapāda's JainendraVyākaraṇa.

5. Pravacanasāra-saroja-bhāskara: A commentary on Kundakunda's work.

6.?Śākatāyana-nyāsa: mentioned in Mahaprajna (1984: 171) and Jainendrasiddhānta-kośa.

Prabhācandra's Contribution and Significance

It has already been noted that Dixit makes contrary statements about Prabhācandra and we have tried to deal with his serious charge regarding mati and smṛti. His comments were the points of departure which inspired the cogitations here. In order to show how unconsidered his views regarding Prabhācandra are, here is a random selection of a few of his own statements to bear this out, pertaining not only to Prabhācandra but also to the Digambara contribution to Jaina and Indian philosophy. Having said this, the usefulness of his work is not in any way belittled; as already said, his study has to be used with care, as in the case of his study of Prabhācandra.

On p. 104 Dixit says that the formal structure of Vādideva's Syād-vāda-ratnākara resembles the PKM "in an extremely close manner" (the PKM is a commentary on the Parīkṣā-mukha of Māṇikyanandin), and that the commentary "closely" follows the PKM. In other words, this is a great tribute paid to the Digambara Prabhācandra for his contribution and significance by a renowned Śvetāmbara thinker like Vādideva.

The fact that Dixit says on p. 104 that "Abhayadeva was considerably indebted to his Digambara predecessors" including Prabhācandra, once again bringing out his significance. Further, he finds it "an instructive study to compare Abhayadeva's indebtedness to his great Digambara predecessors and Vādideva's indebtedness to the same" (p. 105).

It is also generally interesting to quote Dixit, p. 153:

"Akalaṅka's epistemological texts were commented upon by others before as well as after Vidyānandin; (e.g. 'Anantavīrya who commented on Siddhiviniścaya came before Vidyānanda, while Prabhācandra who commented on Laghīyastraya and Vādirāja who commented on Nyāyaviniścaya came after him)."

Dixit seems to have a high opinion of the Digambara Vidyānandin, so much so that he is prompted to say in the same place: "And yet it is Vidyānandin who deserves to be called the commentator of Akalaṅka's epistemological texts even if he formally commented on none of them."

Further on, on p. 156, Dixit notes with regard to the Laghīyas-traya: "inspite of its title, is a collection of 2 works (sic) which are the earliest among Akalaṅka's independent writings". In the available editions there are clearly three short texts, as already noted: Pramāṇa-praveśa, Naya-praveśa and Pravacana-praveśa.

In the same place we read this noteworthy view:

"And as we know Akalaṅka only gradually reached clarity on the question of epistemology which was the central subject-matter of his independent writings. This means that in the form of Laghīyastraya Prabhācandra had before him a rather raw work ["rather unsystematic", ten lines lower down], even if a work coming from the pen of Akalaṅka. In this respect Parīkṣāmukha was just the opposite of Laghīyastraya, for the former lucidly and systematically summarises Akalaṅka's final epistemological findings as perfected by his followers Anantavīrya and Vidyānandin."

Dixit does not seem to appreciate the fine distinction Akalaṅka makes on pratyakṣa, even if others did not pursue his line of thinking.

In conclusion, one last quotation testifying to Prabhācandra as a thinker of note. Jaini JPP, 84–85, says that important works clarifying the material of texts by Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin "were the Parīkṣāmukha of Māṇikyanandin (11 th century); Prabhācandra's commentary thereon, entitled Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, (11 th century); and the same author's substantial Nyāyakumudacandra commentary on Akalaṅka's Laghīyastraya."

On the basis of what has been said on and about Prabhācandra here, there is no doubt at all about his expertise. Moreover, it seems that a closer study of his works can go a long way in better understanding Akalaṅka's complex view(s) on pramāṇas. Ghoshal 1940 has dealt precisely with the crucial issue in Akalaṅka concerning mati and smṛti, which is why it is being quoted in full below. His findings are evidently useful for further studies.

Appendix

Ghoshal 1940: Parīkṣāmukham by Māṇikyanandī, on Akalaṅka from the Introduction, pp. xix–xxiv (pp. xxii and xxiii contain charts of pramāṇa according to Akalaṅka and Umāsvāmī respectively).

"[p. xix] It is of the utmost importance to remember that except in the Jaina Nyāya, we nowhere find knowledge derived from the senses called Parokṣa Pramāṇa. In Hindu Nyāya philosophy [fn. 4 quotes Nyāya-sūtra 1. 1. 4, indriyārtha-sannikarśotpannaṃ (…)] and in all other Hindu Śāstras, knowledge derived from the senses is known as Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. Akalaṅka the greatest of Jain logicians attempted to reconcile this in the following way. He accepted Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa as two Pramāṇas but instead of dividing Pratyakṣa into Śakala and Vikala, he laid down two hitherto unknown divisions viz. [p. xx] Sāṅvyavahārika and Mukhya Pratyakṣa [n. 1 quotes Laghīyastraya Verse 1, read 3: see also n. 2 above]. He further laid down that Mati Jñāna derived through the senses and mind is not Parokṣa but Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa. ^[7] As Mati came to be recognised as Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa, its co-related Smriti, Saṃjñā, Chintā and Abhinibodha as mentioned by Umāsvāmī also came under the same head. But a subtle distinction was made by Akalaṅka. He subdivided Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa into two heads (a) Indriya-pratyakṣa (knowledge derived through the senses) under which came Mati and (b) Anindriya-pratyakṣa (knowledge derived through the mind) ^[8] under which came Smriti, Samjñā, Chintā, and Abhinibodha^[9] as mind is prevalent in these four. This change necessitated a change of definition of Pratyakṣa and Akalaṅka accordingly defined Pratyakṣa as 'clear knowledge.' ('Pratyakṣaṃ viśadaṃ jñānam.')

Now, to meet the argument that if we take Mati as Pratyakṣa we must say that the traditional acceptance of the view that it is Paroksa is denied undermining the oldest authorities like Umāsvāmī, Akalaṅka has written that Mati, Smriti, Samjñā, Chintā, and Abhinibodha will be Pratyakṣa so long as these [p. xxi] remain in the mental state. The moment these are connected with words i.e. are expressed in words they will become Parokṣa. ^[10] Thus, Akalaṅka has accepted Mati etc. as Pratyakṣa in one sense and Parokṣa in another sense. According to Akalaṅka śruta is what is heard and the knowledge having no connection with words is Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa.

The peculiarity of Akalaṅka is that under Śruta in Parokṣa Pramāṇa he has two subdivisions Akṣarātmaka and Anakṣarātmaka. Other Jain logicians have mentioned that Anumāna (inference) is of two kinds Svārthānumāna (inference for one's own self) and Parārthānumāna (inference for the sake of others). Akalaṅka says that it is not inference alone that has these two subdivisions but other Pramāṇas also may be for Svārtha and Parārtha. Svārthānumāna is accepted by Akalaṅka to be included Anakṣarātmaka Śruta Pramāṇa as no help of words is necessary for its acceptance and Parārthānumāna according to Akalaṅka comes within Akṣarātmaka Anumāna as this cannot arise without the help of words. The Pramāṇas Arthāpatti, Āgama etc. are all recognised by Akalaṅka to be varieties of Śruta Pramāṇa.

The following tables will illustrate the difference between the divisions of Pramāṇa by the oldest writers such as Umāsvāmi and Akalaṅka. [Given on pp. xxii f.]

[p. xxiv] The writers who followed Akalaṅka (such as Ananta-vīrya, Vidyānanda etc.) did not accept Smriti etc. as Anindriya-pratyakṣa though in one sense they were ready to accept knowledge derived through the senses to be Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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© The Editor. International Journal of Jaina Studies 2013