Anekāntavāda And Syādvāda: Vyavahāranaya (The Standpoint Of The Particular)

Vyavahāranaya^[1] (The Standpoint Of The Particular)

In contrast with the saṅgraha standpoint the vyavahāra standpoint specialises itself in being concerned with the specific features^[2] of the object concerned, without, of course, losing sight of the fact that they cannot stand by themselves without the support of the generic properties in the larger setting of concrete reality. For example, when a person is asked to bring a mango fruit he attempts to bring, but not any other fruit, although he is aware of the fact that mango is only a species in the genus of friut.^[3]

When the generic correlative of a specific feature is entirely ignored the resultant fallacy comes to have only the semblance of the vyavahāra standpoint (Vyavahāranayābhāsa) of which there can be no better example than the materialism of Cārvāka^[4] in Indian philosophy.

The above three standpoints, viz., naigama, saṅgraha and vyavahāra, come under the first comprehensive category, viz., dravyārthikanaya. This is so because these standpoints concern themselves with the durable side (dravyasaṁsparśī) of concrete reality. The remaining four standpoints, viz., rjusūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha and evambhūta, engage themselves in the analysis of the fleeting side (paryāyasaṁsparśī) of concrete reality. Hence their collective designation (paryāyārthikanaya), the second of the two comprehensive categories.

Among the four paryāyanayas only the first one, viz., rjusūtranaya, which will presently be dealt with, makes a direct ontological reference to an aspect of reality, viz., the aspect of flux (paryāya). The other three are concerned with the verbal questions of the meanings of the modal side of the reality. On the basis of this distinction, viz., the aspect involving an ontological reference and the aspects involving verbal references, the standpoints are also classified as arthanayas (or arthatantra), and śabdanayas (or śabdatantra), the former class including within itself the first four, and the latter class, the last three.^[5]

Jinabhadra, however, chooses to treat rjusūtranaya as one of the dravyanayas on the ostensible ground that it has a direct ontological reference like the other dravyanayas.^[6] But this is not widely accepted. Now the treatment of the four paryāyanayas or the modal standpoints may be resumed.