Dr. N.L. Kachhara
Knowledge is acquired from two sources: sensuous consciousness and transcendental consciousness. Thinking is related to sensuous consciousness; in transcendental consciousness there is vision and introspection but no thinking. According to Jain doctrines, the knowledge gained from sensuous consciousness is only a partial knowledge of a substance. A person that possesses sensory consciousness only knows a part of the substance. This partial knowledge may become the subject of controversy. Five individuals may gain knowledge about five different aspects of any one substance, and each of them believes his own knowledge to be true and that of the others to be untrue. In Jain philosophy an effort has been made to change this approach and understand truth through right vision; this is called "Nayavada."
The non-absolutist standpoint (viewpoint or way of approach and observation) cognizes a single attribute of an object that is possessed of infinite attributes. This is a viewpoint expressing the intention of the speaker (knower), which takes cognizance of a particular (intended) aspect of the object, apprehended through Pramana (valid organ of knowledge), and which does not repudiate other aspects (of that reality).
Naya is a point of view, a vision, and a way of thinking. However, according to Siddhasen Divakar there are as many naya as there are ways of speaking. This kind of extensive approach makes contemplation very difficult. It becomes problematic for the listener or learner to come to any tangible conclusion. In order to simplify this problem, the Jain Acharyas have described two separate points of view:
- Dravyarthiknaya (the substantial point of view) describing a thing with respect to its ultimate substance, i.e. its persistence or permanence.
- Paryarthiknaya (the modal point of view) describing a thing with respect to its modification, i.e. its origination-cessation or impermanence.
These two views have been delineated for the convenience of contemplation and veridical ruling. In fact, thoughts cannot be made veridical by dividing them into the permanent and impermanent. For the exposition of the persistence of thoughts, the substantial viewpoint is adopted; for the exposition of change, the modal point of view is adopted. Both points of view are relative. Nowhere is persistence completely independent of change or vice versa. Yet, to obtain a holistic understanding of existence this arrangement is deemed fit. The substantial point of view analyses the persistence of oneness but does not completely rule out change, as every viewpoint has its own limitations. It does not believe in polemics of the subject matter. Relativity means that there is nothing absolute. One naya only analyzes a portion of the whole, so naturally the remaining portion too remains allied to it. This perception clarifies the theory of relativity of perception.
This relativity is also expressed in words, for as many viewpoints exist as there are ways of thought. The basis of this argument is its mode. Modes are innumerable; hence viewpoints too are innumerable. Only does the combination of innumerable parts enable us to realize the substance in its totality. It is not a correct perception to believe that one mode constitutes the whole. Naya is in no way a false perception. It bears no eagerness to perceive wholeness in a portion; it is not an exposition of absolute truth.
Divergence and identity are two broad areas of contemplation. Identity does not affect behaviour. Divergence becomes the cause for conflict and disharmony. When dwelling on philosophical ideas, it is divergence which gives rise to conflict. The Jain philosophers have endeavored to amalgamate identity and divergence and reduce ideological conflict. According to the anekanta school of thought, total identity and total divergence are absolutist approaches. With these approachs, truth cannot be explained properly.
All nayas are in perfect harmony with the law of anekanta, i.e., when the mundane soul is viewed in its pure and perfect state in accordance with its ultimate aspect, its worldly state (as per its empirical aspect) is not denied, but rather ignored for the time being. The pure soul, being non-corporeal, cannot be perceived by the sense organs and is an object of pure and perfect knowledge (omniscience) only. But the soul, even in the purest state, neither surrenders its individuality nor relinquishes its dynamic constitution and continues to possess its own pure qualities. It must always be remembered that the soul's pure/emancipated state of existence and the worldly embodied state are both equally real, yet neither of them is an Absolute Truth.
