A naya is defined[1] as a particular opinion or (abhiprāya or abhimata) or a viewpoint (apeksā)—a viewpoint which does not rule out other different viewpoints and is, thereby, expressive of a partial truth (vastvamśagrāhī) about an object (vastu)—as entertained by a knowing agent (jñātṛ).[2] A naya is a particular viewpoint about an object or an event, there being many other viewpoints which do not enter into, or interfere with the particular viewpoint under discussion. Although the other viewpoints do not enter into the perspective[3] of the particular viewpoints under dicussion they constantly, as it were, attack its frontiers, and await its reconciliation with them in the sphere of a fuller and more[4] valid knowledge which is the sphere of pramāṇa.
Theoratically the viewpoints from which an object or an event could be perceived are not merely numerous[5] (anekavikalpa) but infinite[6] in number (anantaprakāram) because even the humblest fact of existence is infinitely manifold and therefore can be an object of various modes of analysis. But this way of looking at the subject is too broad (vyāsa or vistāra[7]) or gross (sthūla) and, therefore, does not vouchsafe to us a compact view of reality on the basis of which we can develop a practicable analytical method by means of which we may tackle reality piecemeal and obtain partial glimpses of its truth. The view of reality, conceived under the great division consisting of two inclusive categories, viz., dravyārthikanaya or the substantive view, and paryāyārthikanaya or the modal (or the modificational) view, is however, considered to be an answer to the demand.[8] The categories are also called, briefly, as dravyanaya and paryāyanaya respectively. The view of reality conceived under the division is described as the concise (saṅkṣepa or samāsa[9]) one in contrast to the other (the broad) one.
By a process of further analysis the Jaina thinkers have been led to the formulation of the methodological scheme consisting of seven ways of looking at reality. They are enumerated in the following order of decreasing denotation[10]: naigama, saṅhgraha, vyavahāra, rjusūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha, and evambhūta.[11] Generally among these the first three are considered to be dravyanayas or substantive standpoints and the other four paryāyanayas or modal standpoints.[12] Reserving to a later stage[13] the consideration of the question whether the number of these seven ways of viewpoints can be reduced to six, or five, or even less, either by elimination of any of them, or by subsumption of some of them under the one or the other of the seven viewpoints, we may now proceed to point out, with illustrations, the nature and function of these seven viewpoints.
nayo dharmāntarāpekṣī dumayas tannirākṛtiḥ//ASA on AMS, 1.47.
pramāṇaparicchinnasya anantadharmātmakasya vastunā ekade'sa-grāhiṇaḥ taditarāṃśapratikṣepiṇo adhyavasāyavid eṣa nayaḥ/. JTBY, P. 21 (CF. PNTA, VII. 1, and SRK thereon, in SRK, p. 1044). nayantīti nayāḥ anekadharmātmakaṁ vastu ekadharmeṇa nityamevedam anityameveti vā nirūpayanti/" See NKC, Vol. II, p. 606 f„ f.n. 1.
The above conclusion is generally agreed to in spirit if not in letter also, but most writers including Vidyānanda, Jinabhadra and his commentator Maladhāri Hemachandra, however, do not seem to accede to this conclusion whole-heartedly, although they do not eventually disagree with it (see VBJ, gā. 2277 and SHM thereon). For some of expressions with which they describe the nature of nayas are more appropriate to the description of the nature of nayābhāsas or durnayas". For instance, nayas are said to be incapable of being vastuno gamakāḥ (pratyekāvasthāyāṁ tadagamakatvāt). Further, they are said to be heretical (mithyātmadṛṣṭitvāt), contradictory (virodhato, or virodhitvāt), inimical (vairivat) in their character.
Another factor which seems to confirm the attitude of Jinabhadra, more especially of his great commentator, is the quotation, by the latter, of a devotional verse, the second line of which is in tune with the view suggested by the two writers:udadhāviva sarvasindhavaḥ samudīrnāstvayi nātha dṛṣṭayaḥ /
na ca tāsu bhavān pradṛśyate pravibhaktosu saritsvivodadhiḥ //See VBJ, gā. 2266 and SHM, on 2265-6.
Jāvanto vayanapahā tāvanto vā nayāvi sahāvo/ VBJ, gā. 2265.
vyāsato' nekavikalpā iti / PNTA, VII. 4 and the SRK thereon in SRK, p. 1047.