Srichand Rampuria
This standpoint concerns itself with the general[1] or the class character of a factual situation, unlike the naigama standpoint which includes the specific character as well. Just as naigamanaya is not hostile to the intermingled character of concrete existence, so also saṅgrahanaya is not repugnant[2] to the complementary feature of viśeṣa which is not included in it. Saṅgrahanaya marks a step further from naigamanaya in that it differentiates, in its analytical process, the common character from the universal-cum-particular complex which every real is. For instance, when, pointing to a tree at some distance from you, you observe to a stranger asking for direction, "turn left near the tree there", it is not relevant to the occasion to mention whether "the tree there" is mango, banyan, or any other, although "the tree" must be one of these. For there can be no universal without a particular,[3] or a genus without species, although in a particular context the mention of the former will serve the purpose in hand. Similarly, when we state that everything is sat[4] (being) it makes a perfectly understandable proposition, although it provisionally shuts out its necessary complement of asat (non-being).
Laying such an exaggerated emphasis[5] on the universal as to leave no room at all for the particular leads to saṅgrahābhāsa, a fallacy of which the Sāṅkhya and the Advaita schools of philosophy are notable instances.[6]
