Applied Philosophy Of Anekanta: 1.2 The Period of Establishment of Anekānta (5-8th cent.CE)

It may be noted here that the all-round development of the anekānta philosophy took place in the history, when Saṃskṛta language was first of all used by the Jain writers. The anekānta philosophy, being itself a synthetic development, historically pre-supposes the existence of many rival and well-developed philosophical schools. In fact, the Jaina philosophy unfolded itself in the context of many severe and serious controversies among such schools as the Sāṅkhya, Bauddha, Nyaya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. Pandita Sukhalalji Sanghavi and Bechardasji Doshi, two erudite (modem) scholars of Jainism, have described the situations as follows:

When the Saṃskṛta language found a place in Jain Literature and along with the language, the logical method as well as the philosophical discussion was ushered into Jain Literature, the discussion of this doctrine gathered strength in the passage of time. The details were then multiplied and rival current thoughts, arguments and proofs were also found a consistent place, with their original nature in the discussion of this doctrine.^[1]

In this golden philosophical age of Indian Philosophy, the Sage Gautama composed his Nyāya Sūtra in 200-450 CE. According to Professor Dhruva, the Sage Kanāda composed his Vaisésikā Sūtra in the first century BCE and Bādarāyaṇa wrote his Brahmasūtra in the fourth century CE. The Sāṃkhya Sūtrā was composed by Muni Kapila in 6-7 century. Īśvarakṛṣṇa composed his Sāṅkhyakārikā between the second and the fourth centuries CE.

The Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas were considered pioneers in the field of logic. The Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (300 CE) criticized Nyāya-sūtra and inturn Vātsyāyana (400 CE) gave the reply in his Nyāyasūtrabhāsya. The Buddhist Ācārya Dignāga (500 CE) criticized the views of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara (600 CE) and gave the reply to the former in his Nyāya Vārtika. The Buddhist Ācārya Dharmakirti in his Nyāyabindu refuted the views of Uddyotakara. The Buddhist ācārya Dharmottara, in his commentary on Nyāyabindu has strongly supported the views of Diganāga and Dharmakirti. Vacaspati Misra (800 CE) in his Nyāyavārtikatāt- paryatīkā re­established the position of Uddyotakara by refuting the Buddhist criticism of the Nyāya doctrines.

The refutation and counter-refutation of the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas went on with unabated zeal from the third upto the eighth century CE. This battle of arguments ushered in a new era of logic, when there prevailed conflicts between philosophies, the philosophers are prone to strengthen their respective position through refutation of others by means of logic, relegating the scripture to a secondary place of importance. A philosopher does not depend on the scriptures for the support of his views, but he requires logic in defence of his position.

From this time onward a very important period in the history of Jaina philosophy begins. In the words of Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana, 'In this era of logic, there existed no systematic Jain treatise on logic, its principles being included in the works of metaphysics and religion. With the commencement of the historical period in 453 CE there grew up, among the Jainas in both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects, a band of scholars, who devoted themselves to the study of logic with great interest and enthusiasm. ^[2]

It is during this golden age of Jain philosophy that we meet for the first time two great logicians namely, Siddhasena Divākara (a Śvetāmbara) and Samantabhadra (a Digambara), who both belonged to 7th cent. CE and 7th & 8th Cent. CE. By introducing a systematic study of logic, they laid the foundation of logic among the Jainas for the first time. Both of them were brilliant scholars, who acquired a great prominence in their epoch. Siddhasena Divākara's Nyāyāvatāra is the first treatise on Jaina logic, composed in 32 kārikās (verses). It occupies a respectable position in Jaina logic on account of its being a pioneer work on the subject. In Nyāyāvatāra, he says that,

anekāntmataṁ vastugocharaṁ sarvesaṁ vidāṁ,
eka desaviśistortho nayasya visayo mataḥ.

It means, the omniscient can perceive the multi­dimensional nature of a reality, where as one stand point cognition is done through naya. ^[3]

Sanmati Tarka is considered as the book of anekāntavāda and nayavāda. The word 'Anekānta' does not appear in the agamās. As per Ācārya Mahāprajña, the word was first used in the beginning of the age of philosophical writings. Probably, Siddhasena Divākara was the first to use it. ^[4]

jeṇa viṇā logassa vavahāro savvahāṇa na nivvādaē,
tassa bhuvaṇeka guruṇo ṇamo anegaṇta vāyassa.

He says, 'I salute anekāntavāda for without which even day to day transactions of society and family would not be managed.' In Sanmati Tarka, Siddhasena has introduced quite a number of non-Jaina problems, such as the problem of the causality, general and the particular, difference-cum-identity of attributes and modes, substance and modes etc. and finally established his own anekāntika point of view. His declaration was that, all the heretical doctrines combined together form the true Jaina doctrine of syādvāda, a synthetic and comprehensive view, is really very remarkable in the annals of the Jaina tradition. The following verse of Siddhasena shows the all-embracing range of doctrine of anekānta:

bhayaṇā vi hu bhaivyavā jai bhayaṇā bhayāī savvādavvaeṁ,
evaṁ bhayaṇā ṇiyamo vi hoe samayāviroheṇa.

As the doctrine of anekānta shows all possible sides of a thing and thus does not postulate about a thing in any fixed way, in the same way anekānta itself is also subject to this possibility of other side, that is to say, it also sometimes assumes the form of one-sidedness (ekānta). ^[5] Siddhasena admits that thus anekānta may also become ekānta, if it does not go with against the right view of things. Here I want to highlight the deep study of Siddhasena who expounded, first of all, that if we accept anekānta as the absolute theory of attaining truth of reality, then such a perspective is also (ekāntic) or one-sided view. But most of the scholars assert that this novel view was first of all predicted by Samantabhadra. From the historical point of view; we have to wipe out this misconception and give due credit to Siddhasena, which he deserves.

Samantabhadra also composed works like Āpta Mīmāmsā, Svayambhūstotra, Yuktyanusāsana etc., where he elaborately discussed about the doctrine of syādvāda. In his Āpta Mīmāmsā, in the course of his discussion of Saptabhaṅgī, he has introduced quite a host of problems such as sat, asat, dvaita, advaita, ekatva, pṛthakatva, nityatva, anityatva, daiva, puruṣārtha and others and applied anekāntic method of resolution to every philosophical problems.

Samantabhadra also wrote in Saṃskṛta language in tune with the view of Siddhasena. He said that anekānta is also anekāntic, i.e. non-absolutism is not the only way, through which we proceed in the direction of searching the truth, and absolutism is also a way. The verse goes as:

anekāntopyanekānth pramāṇa naya sadhanaḥ,
anekāntḥ pramāṇātte tadekāntorpitānnayāt.

If anekānta is anekānta in the true sense, then there must not be any insistence that anekānta is the only way to realize the truth and there is no other way.

Then we come to the age of Mallavādin (end of 7th cent. CE), the commentator of Sanmati Tarka, who wrote an independent text, entitled "Nayacakra". In this text, it is said that by defeating Buddhism in a dispute, Logician Mallavādin re-established the Jaina faith. Jinabhadra Gani (7th or 8th cent. CE) is called as a great authority on the sacred literature of the Jainas. His text, Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, is considered as the encyclopaedia of the Jaina views. He almost followed the definition of anekānta as accepted by the Siddhasena. Here comes to an end the period of establishment of anekānta.