Dr. Samani Shashi Pragya
The Majjhimnikāya (Cūlamālunkya-sutta) lists the ten avyākhyāta, not to be answered or explained, questions are as follows[1]:
- Is the loka (universe) eternal?
- Is the loka not eternal?
- Is it (the loka) finite (with an end)?
- Is the loka not finite?
- Is the soul identical to the body?
- Is the soul different from the body?
- Does the Tathāgata exist after death?
- Does the Tathāgata not exist after death?
- Does he both exist and not exist after death?
- Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?
Various speculations have been made with regard to these avyākyhāta questions. The above mentioned ten questions[2] can be summarized with in three questions. These queries are as follows:
- The question of permanence and transience and finiteness and infiniteness of the loka (universe),
- The question of oneness and separateness of the soul and the body; and
- The question of permanence and impermanence of the soul.
It could be possible that Buddha, in choosing not to be committal in answering the ten questions in either an affirmative way or a negative way, might have dismissed them as inexplicable, though much later on, he believed and asserted that everything is anitya or evanescent. However, the clarification of the first four questions form among the ten, which were considered inexplicable by Lord Buddha, is available in the adhikāra of Skandak-Parivrājaka in Bhagavatī Sūtra.
All these questions remained unanswered by him, because he considered that these questions were irrelevant to the practical teaching of the four noble truths. He says, one can refer to the parable of the man shot with an arrow. When that man is bleeding to death, it is irrelevant, and rather stupid, to ask, "Who shot the arrow?" For the immediate need would be to pull out the arrow and save the man from dying. In another place, Buddha exposed, how utterly senseless was the question about whether Tathāgata exists after death or not. I just show the path of the destruction of birth and death and only this is fruitful to you and rest of the questions of eternality of loka etc. should be considered as inexplicable.
The first two avyākyhāta questions were explained by Mahāvīra in the following manner:
"Bhikkhu Jamālī was asked by Honorable Goutama as follows: fIs the world eternal or is it non-eternal?1 Being asked in this manner, Jamālī was thus confused, the venerable Mahāvīra told Bhikkhu Jamālī thus: Jamālī" I have many disciples who are nirgrantha ('without a stitch') ascetics and not even omniscient, but they are able to tell the answer as much as I can. Otherwise, they would not have spoken to you, as they have in the present case. The world is, Jamālī, eternal. It did not cease to exist at any time, it does not cease to exist at any time and it will not cease to exist at any time. It was, it is and it will be. It is constant, permanent, eternal, imperishable, indestructibly, always existing. [3]
The world is, Jamālī, non-eternal. For it becomes progressive (in time-cycle) after being regressive. And it becomes regressive after becoming progressive.
The soul (i.e. living being) is, Jamālī, eternal. For it did not cease to exist at any time. The soul is, Jamālī, non-eternal. For it becomes animal after being a hellish creature, becomes a man, after becoming an animal and it becomes god after being a man."
Several points may be noted in this connection. First, Jamālī was confused and remained silent in the beginning, for the question had several ambiguities. Mahāvīra stated that not only he could answer it but also most of his ordinary disciples could, (Was it an oblique reference to the 'silence' of the Buddha, when he first tried to avoid answering such question?) The question might have been ambiguous, but were not unanswerable.
Secondly, in the first four avyākyhāta questions, the subject was "loka". Since it ambiguously means both 'the world' and 'the person'. Mahāvīra used two separate sets of questions, with two different subjects, 'the world' and 'the soul', thus, perhaps foreshadowing the Jain ontological distinction between the living and the non-living (spirit and matter). Resolution of ambiguities is, as I have already noted, part of the vibhajya method. Third, and this is more important, Mahāvīra, unlike the Buddha, did not reject both of the seemingly contradictory predicates ('infinite' and 'finite'), but rather accepted both of them and avoided the seeming contradiction by showing (or exposing) the different senses in which these predicates could be used. Thus, it could hardly be regarded as an acceptance of a real contradiction. To use the later day philosophic terminology of the Jains, the world, from the point of view (naya) of continuity, may be called eternal, but from the point of view of change of its states, it is non-eternal. This probably foreshadowed also the Jain view of synthesis of the Buddhist doctrine of universal flux with the Vedānta doctrine of the unchanging Brahman,
Regarding the third and the fourth avyākhyata questions, Mahāvīra had the following to say:[4]
‘Skandaka [5], the resolve for query arose in your mind that 'Is the world finite? Is the world infinite? Etc.'
The reply to this query is - O Skandaka, that the world has been propounded by me in four ways, viz., with respect to substance, space, time and modes. With respect to substance, the world is an unitary entity and it has an end. With respect to space, the world is 107 X 107 times innumerable yojanas in length and breadth and 107 X 107 times innumerable yojanas in circumference. Thus, it has an end.
With respect to time, it was never non-existent; it is never nonexistent; it will never be non-existent in future; it was, it is and it will be, it is eternal, fixed, perennial, indestructible, imperishable, ever present and persistent, and thus it has no end, i.e., it is infinite.
With respect to modes, the world has an infinite number of colour-modes, an infinite number of smell-modes, an infinite number of taste-modes, an infinite number of configuration-modes, an infinite number of heavy-cum-light-modes and an infinite number of neither-heavy-nor-light-modes; and thus it has no end, i.e., it is infinite.
Thus, O Skandaka, with respect to substance, the world has an end; with respect to space, it has an end; with respect to time, the world has no end; with respect to mode, it has no end.
Afterwards, the same questions were raised with regard to the soul (Jīva) and Mahāvīra proceeded to solve them as follows:
Skandaka, the following queries came to your mind - Is the soul with end? Is the soul without end?
The reply to this query is - O Skandaka, that the soul has been propounded by me in four ways, viz., with respect to substance, space, time and modes.
With respect to substance, the soul is unitary entity and it has an end.
With respect to space, the soul is possessed of innumerable soul-units and the soul occupies innumerable space-units. Thus, it has an end.
With respect to time, it was never non-existent in the past, it is never non-existent in the present, and never nonexistent in the future; it was, it is and it will be; it is eternal, fixed, perennial, indestructible, imperishable, ever present and persistent, and thus it has no end, i.e., it is infinite.
With respect to mode, the soul has an infinite number of modes of knowledge, an infinite number of modes of conduct, an infinite number of modes of heaviness and lightness, an infinite number of modes of neither-heavy-nor-light, and thus it has no end, i.e., it is infinite.
Thus, O Skandaka, with respect to substance, the soul is finite; with respect to space, the soul is finite; with respect to time, the soul is infinite; and with respect to mode, the soul is infinite. [5]
It is clear from the above dialogue that when Mahāvīra tried to answer the so-called avyākhyata questions through the vibhajya method, he had analyzed that from four different ways, and thereby clarified the ambiguity contained in, such predicate-expressions, "infinite" and "finite". "Infinite" may mean 'limitless in number of measurement' or 'everlasting'. Similarly, "finite" may mean 'limited in number or measurement' or 'of limited duration'. Notice that all these perspectives have been taken into account in Mahāvīra's method of analysis. One can thus agree with the principle of Mahāvīra, without necessarily agreeing with the Jain mythological account of the universe and man. It is also to be noticed that Mahāvīra's analysis is different from that of Buddha, as Buddha maintained his doctrine of the Middle path, by rejecting the two alternative questions, positive and negative, while Mahāvīra came closer to the anekāntavāda by accepting both extreme alternatives with proper qualifications and conditionalization.
To the fifth and the sixth questions also, Mahāvīra gave positive answers. For the last four questions too, Mahāvīra's answer would be very definite, for he would say, following the Jaina religious faith, that the Tathāgata or the saint exists and reaches the end of the universe after death.
The above sketch shows how the vibhajya method in the hands of Mahāvīra was transformed into the anekānta philosophy of the Jains. If the vibhajya method is interpreted only as a method of analysis and classification, then the Jaina anekānta method may be regarded as the opposite of it, i.e., synthesis. But, in fact, the vibhajya method was a generic name for any non-dogmatic and exploratory approach to philosophic and metaphysical questions. It included analysis and synthesis, differentiation and integration.
Mahāvīra thus developed a philosophy of synthesis and toleration, which later came to be designated as the anekāntavāda.
Buddha's method was one of withdrawal from philosophic disputes, for he avoided committing himself to any extreme view. In the Niryukti of Sutrakrtmga Sūtra, we find that during the period of Mahavira, the Jina, four doctrines were prominent:
asiyasayaṃ kiriyāṇaṃ, akkiriyāṇaṃ cahai culasīti. annāṇiya sataṭṭhī veṇaiyāṇaṃ ca battīsa[6]
i) kriyāvāda ii) akriyāvāda iii) ajāñavāda, iv) vinayavāda and sub-branches of four doctrines were 363 in number. In that period also, so many diverse philosophies prevailed. But Mahāvīra's method was one of the commitment, for he attempted to understand the points of view of the debating parties (in a philosophical dispute), so that their dispute could be resolved and reconciled. Thus the essence of the anekāntavāda lies in exposing and making explicit the standpoints or presuppositions of different philosophical schools of thought.
The sevenfold predication was historically a later development in Jainism, for we do not find it clearly mentioned in the early canons. A.N. Upadhye, [7] however, has located references to the three primary predicates (instead of seven) in the Bhagavatī Sūtra. In this context, let me quote Jocobi's statement that in opposition to the Agnosticism of Sañjaya, Mahāvīra has established the syādvāda which served to silence some strictly dogmatic opponents. [8] Undoubtedly the above statement of the learned scholar is thoughtful and requires considerable attention. To make the point more clear, in the words of Prof. Barua, who follows the same view, we can say that "to avoid error, Sañjaya contended with the four famous negative propositions: A is not B; A is not nor B; A is not both B and not-B; A is neither B nor not-B. It is with regard to the self-same questions that Mahāvīra declared that from these alternatives you cannot arrive at truth; from these alternatives you are certainly led to error." [9] This is quite true. But thereby we cannot deny the germs of the doctrine of anekāntavāda in Jaina philosophy before Sañjaya.
We have seen Umāsvāti (2nd cent. CE) didn't make any explicit reference to the seven alternative predicates. In the ten Niryuktis of Bhadrabahu also there is no mention of the saptabhangī, but it is for the first time in the works of a Digambara Jaīna Ācārya Kundakunda, (2nd cent. CE) we find the full-fledged seven atlernative predicates in one of his gāthā of Pancāstikāya[10]
siyā atthi natthiubabhaṁ avvattavvaṁ puno yattattidayaṁ,
dawaṁ khu sattabhanga adesavasena sambhavadi.
It means: The Seven Predications are:
Syād asti, syād nāsti, syād asti nāsti, syād avaktavyaṁ, syād asti avaktavyaṁ, syād nāsti avaktavyaṁ and syād asti-nāsti avaktavyaṁ.
3 Pancāstikāya of Kundakunda. Ed. A. Chakravartinayar, verse-14.
