Dr. Samani Mangal Pragya
The above-mentioned philosophies are discussed thoroughly in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga and this expresses that the presentation of contemporary concepts of soul was made to differentiate their concept of soul, from that of Jain tradition. Cārvaka, Upanisad philosophy, Sānkhya and Buddhist philosophical concepts are available even today as these are described in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga. The commentator has presented Ātmaṣaṣṭavāda in the name of Sānkhya and Shaivādhikārī, but, in the literature of those philosophies available at present, such conception is not available. Probably, in those days people had that concept.
Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika also had a belief in the existence of the soul, but, their concept of soul is not available in Sūtrakṛtāṅga. Modern scholars have tried to relate Ātmaṣaṣṭavāda with Pakudhakatyayana, but, nothing definite can be said in this regard.
The Jain concept of soul which comes forward from the above mentioned discussion is as follows-
- The soul is not constituted by five bhūtas, it has an independent existence and it is conscious by nature.
- The world is not of one type, it has various kinds of beings. The soul is not one in number. There are multiple souls.
- The soul is different from the body, it transmigrates to other worlds and undergoes rebirth.
- The soul is a doer.
- The soul is eternal with inherent transformations.
- The soul is not momentary (Ekāntakṣaṇika).
- The soul is not constituted by the Pañcaskandha and caturdhātu. It has an independent consciousness existence. It is both with cause and causeless.
It means it is dravyaparyāyātmaka. Its modes have cause and its substantial existence has no cause. It can be concluded as per the explanation of causal and causeless, given in the Vṛtti.[1]
After the refutation of all these theories, the commentator of Sūtrakṛtāṅga mentions the concept of soul, as accepted by the Jains and says that- the soul is transformative, the basis of knowledge, transmigratory, different from material elements, different-qua- indifferent from the body.[2]
The Buddhist philosophy has refuted both the causal and causeless existence of the soul.[3] Jain accepts dual causality of soul from different standpoints i.e. with cause and causeless. Due to karmas that are the cause of the state of hell, sub-human, human and celestial form of life, the soul undergoes various modes. It therefore has existence with a cause. The inherent nature of self is eternal and indestructible, implying it is causeless also.[4]
Before presenting the conception of Determinism, a verse is given in the prologue of the Sūtrakṛtāṅga.[5] Some words in that verse are worthy to note and commentator has attempted to draw attention towards them.
The following words in the verse viz. uvavaṇṇā, puḍho, jiyā, veḍyanti suhaṃ dukkham, aduvā luppanti ṭhaṇāo etc. present the conception of the soul in Jainism and refute other philosophies.
- Uvavaṇṇā: It means that jīva is proved by reasoning. Concepts like Pañcabhūtavāda and Tatfivataccharīravād are rejected by this term.
- Puḍho : Jīva is different from the aspect of the body or from the point of birth in different states of life, like hell etc. it rejects the monist attitude towards the soul.
- Jīya-soul: By this term, Buddhist beliefs are rejected which believe in the absence of the soul, besides Pañcaskandha.
- Veḍayanti suham dukkhaṁ: Each soul experiences happiness and pain. By this belief, the inactive nature of the soul is rejected. The inactive soul and the pure form of the soul does not feel happiness and pain.
- Aduvā luppanti thāṇāo : By this term, transmigration of the soul from one birth to another is accepted.[6] It may also be anticipated that by accepting the soul as subject of transmigrations, its all-pervasive existence is negated. We can assume that.
The analysis of soul as found in Sūtrakṛtāṅga has become the basis for Jain philosophers. They have always presented their concept of the soul in and around these conceptions.
The Niryuktikāra has discussed about arthadhikāra in the sections of the first chapter of the Sūtrakṛtāṅga. Six arthādhikāra (subjects) are discussed in the first section - Pañcabhūtvāda, Ekātmavāda, Tajjivataccharīravāda, Akārakavāda, Atmaśaṣṭhavāda and Aphalavāda.[7] Aphalavāda is separately mentioned in the niryukti. According to sequence, its relation is with Buddhist philosophy, but, the Vṛtti kāra has said that all the theories from Pañcabhūavāda upto Atmaśaṣṭhavāda, are included under Aphalavāda.[8]
After analyzing all the facts of the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, we understand that the author has mainly criticized the philosophical ideas by putting ātmavāda (the doctrine of the soul), karmavāda (the doctrine of karma) and sṛṣṭivāda (the doctrine of world) at the centre. We have already discussed conceptions regarding the soul. Now, in the discussion of karma, it is desirable to discuss its pros and cons in this context.
